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TRADE CORPORATIONS
AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE CASH BALANCES for large trade
corporations reveals some striking differences from manufacturing
corporations and also some similarities.The purpose of the
present chapter is to point out these differences and similarities,
although the preceding analysis used for manufacturing companies
will not be repeated point by point.
The samples of trade corporations, on which the following dis-
cussion is based, are small' and, therefore, no generalizations of
the conclusions of this chapter are permissible. However, when
the results obtained are similar for both trade and manufacturing
corporations, the presumption seems warranted that these results
are due to forces in the economic system which affect various types
of enterprise in the same fashion, no matter what line of activity
may be carried on by an enterprise.
INTERWAR PERIOD
A comparison of average cash balances and payments of the
samples of large trade corporations with corresponding series for
samples of large manufacturing corporations reveals conspicuous
differences between the two groups.
In the period between the two World Wars, the large trade
corporations of our sample grew more rapidly than the large
manufacturing corporations, a fact which is reflected in the trends
of both cash balances and payments. The trends of these series for
the trade companies rise more sharply than those for large manu-
facturing corporations. (Compare Chart 19 and Chart 10.)
The two curves for large trade corporations, although they do
not show the same direction of movement year by year, show a
greater degree of parallelism than the corresponding curves for
manufacturing corporations. In particular the depression of 1930-
33 is reflected in a decline not only in the payments figures of the
1Fora description of these samples see Appendix A.
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Chart19—ESTIMATEDANNUAL CASH PAYMENTS AND AVERAGE
CASH BALANCES OF SAMPLES OF LARGE TRADE CORPORATIONS
The trends of both cash balances and payments indicate that large
corporations grew more rapidly than large manufacturing corpora-
tions in the period between the two World Wars.Trade Corporations 95
large trade corporations (which had begun in 1929) but also in
the cash balances of these companies; the cash balances of large
manufacturing corporations, on the other hand, rose somewhat
above the level of 1929.
The upward trend of the cash balances of large trade corpora-
tionsis steeper than that of payments; thisisalso true for
manufacturing corporations in the interwar period but there is a
marked difference of degree between the two groups in this respect.
For large trade corporations the upward trend of the ratio of
cash to payments is steeper than that for manufacturing companies.
(See Chart 20 and Chart 11.)In the case of the latter group it
may even be doubtful that one should speak of a rising trend at all
(although a straight trend line fitted mathematically to the curve
representing the ratio of cash to payments for large manufacturing
corporations would have a positive slope), since the ratio of cash
to payments in the expansion year 1937 shows a definite tendency
to return to the level of the twenties. But there can be no doubt
about the rising trend of the ratio of cash to payments for large
trade corporations.
The reason for the rising trend of the ratio for large trade
companies cannot be definitely established on the basis of the
available material; very likely it is connected with the rapid growth
of the companies included in the sample. In this connection it is
significant that the ratio for our sample of small trade corpora-
tions, which did not undergo a similar rapid growth, does not
display any upward trend. But why this rapid growth of large
trade corporations should bring about a rising trend in the ratio
of cash to payments is not self-evident. 'Without further infor-
mation about the form in which this growth took place2 and the
changes in the habit of payments which may have accompanied it,3
a definite answer cannot be given.
When the cyclical movement of the ratio is examined, conspicu-
ous differences between large manufacturing and large trade cor-
2 New chain stores, for instance, may require quite different ratios of cash to pay-
ments according to their geographical locations, e.g., whether they are located in
agricultural or industrial districts.
8 The growth of department stores may, for instance, have been accompanied by
a growing habit of placing large single orders, which lead to large lump-sum pay-
ments. The latter necessitate a higher ratio of cash balances to payments of the corn-
panies concerned. (See the discussion in Chapter 4.)96 Corporate Cash Balances, 1914.43
Chart20—LIQUIDITYRATIOS OF SAMPLES OF TRADE
porations are again found. The ratio for the latter group in the
thirties does not show the inverse cyclical pattern displayed by
manufacturing corporations; for large trade corporations the ratio
does not show a marked rise after 1930. If the trend of the ratio
were used as a basis for calculating "free" cash, followingthe
method described for manufacturing companies,4 "free" cash
would appear in 1930 just as in the case of large manufacturing
SeeChapter 4, pp. 40.41.Trade Corporations 97
corporations, but in contrast to the latter it would decline in 1931
and rise again from 1932 to 1934. From then on through 1938 the
"free" cash of trade corporations would show the same movement
as that of manufacturing corporations —decreasingduring ex-
pansion and increasing during contraction.
If marketable securities are taken into account, these differences
between large trade and large manufacturing corporations dis-
appear, to a great extent.First of all, the trend of the ratio of
cash plus marketable securities to payments of large trade cor-
porations for the period from 1921 to 1939 is approximately
horizontal; in addition, the cyclical pattern of the ratio between
1929 and 1938 is the same as that for large manufacturing cor-
porations.5 From these comparisons itfollows that the main
difference between the two groups is in the distribution of their
liquid funds between cash and marketable securities. In particular,
large trade corporations bought marketable securities in 1931 on a
relatively larger scale6 than the manufacturing corporations. The
appearance of "free" liquid funds in 1930, their decline during
the upswing after 1933, and their sharp rise in the recession year
of 1938 are therefore common to both groups.
The reasons for the fluctuations in "free" funds are the same
for both groups. The trade companies liquidated "operating"
assets (mainly inventories) during 1930-3 3, and thereby increased
their cash holdings or marketable securities; some of these addi-
tional liquid funds were used to pay a substantial part of their
bank debts, but since the large trade corporations were not greatly
indebted to banks around 1929, this outlet did not absorb all the
surplus liquid funds, just as in the case of large manufacturing
corporations. Nor did the excess of dividend payments over cur-
rent earnings or the retirement of long-term debt amount to a
large sum in the contraction years In 1938 a relatively
small liquidation of operating assets added to the liquid funds.
These funds could not be used to reduce bank debts, since such
debts of large trade corporations had practically disappeared at
5Theonly difference is that the lowest ratio for large trade corporations is reached
in 1936 and for large manufacturing corporations in 1937.
6,They more than doubled their holdings of marketable securities in this one year.
7Thetrade companies never experienced actual losses. Their dividend payments
were somewhat greater than their current earnings in 1930 and 1932.Long-term
debts were retired in 1932 and 1933 by not quite $4 million.98 Corporate Cash Ralances, 1914-43
that time. Earnings were higher than dividend payments and there
was even a small increase in long-term funds from outside. On
the other hand current operating expenses declined.All this
resulted in a rise in the ratio of liquid funds to payments in
that year.
It should be mentioned that the depression of 1921 also brought
about a sharp rise in the ratio of liquid funds to payments for large
trade corporations, which was followed by an almost equally
sharp decline in 1923. The year 1921 (and to a much smaller
extent 1922) was a year of selling out of inventories. Although
the bulk of the funds released in this way were used to reduce
bank debts, the latter did not absorb all of the funds. This to-
gether with the decline in operating expenses is mainly responsible
for the movement of the ratio of liquid funds to payments in the
recession of 1921.
The ratio of cash to payments for medium-sized and small trade
corporations shows relatively small variations in the period be-
tween the two World Wars; they are even smaller than those of
the corresponding group of manufacturing corporations. "Free"
cash is therefore of minor importance in the case of this size group
of corporations, no matter whether they are engaged in trade or
manufacturing.The reasons are similar for both groups of
companies.8
WORLD WAR I
The percentage increase that occurred between the end of 1914
and the end of 1918inthe cash balances of the large trade cor-
porations of sample B (see Table D-4, Appendix D) was less
than that for large manufacturing corporations and for total
means of payment. Since payments of large trade corporations
increased at a more rapid rate than their cash balances, the ratio
of average cash to payments is found to have been less at the end
of the war than at the beginning (Table 6). This, in contrast to
the manufacturing corporations, is also true if marketable securi-
ties are taken into account, although the companies of sample B
began to buy marketable securities in 1917 and continued their
8Since"permanent investments" and marketable securities are not given separately
in the balance sheet, the ratio of "liquid" funds to payments cannot be computed for
these companies.Trade Corporations 99
Table 6—LIQUIDITY POSITION OF SAMPLE B
OF LARGE TRADE CORPORATIONSJ 1915-22a




















1915 $14.0 .* $311.7 4.5% 4.5%
1916 13.4 .. 398.6 3.4 3.4
1917 10.8 $ 1.4 479.6 2.3 2.6
1918 13.9 5.8 514.7 2.7 3.8
1919 23.1 11.3 631.8 3.7 5.4
1920 23.9 13.8 819.1 2.9 4.6
1921 26.0 15.0 568.1 4.6 7.2
1922 31.5 15.2 634.3 5.0 7.4
a Fora description of the sample see Appendix A.
b Average of two successive year-end figures.
C Ratio of average cash of two successive year ends to total payments in the year
between the two dates.
d Ratio of average cash plus average marketable securities of two successive year
ends to total payments in the year between the two dates.
purchases on a larger scale in 1918. The postwar inventory boom
of 1920 therefore could not be financed by drawing on excess liquid
funds; instead, the corporations had to rely on bank credit. Their
notes payable rose in the one year, f920, by $46.1 million or 233
percent. The ratioos of cash and of cash plus marketable securities
to payments which the companies maintained in the years 1916-18
were the lowest in the whole period of 1915-43.
For the medium-sized and small trade corporations (for which
balance sheet figures are available only since the end of 1916)
the ratio of cash to payments fell slightly between 1917 and 1918.
If the item "investments" is included on the assumption that the
larger part of the increase during the two last years of the war
consisted of marketable securities, the ratio of liquid funds to
payments is found to have risen oniy slightly (from 2.3 ptrcent
in 1917 to 2.9 percent in 1918). This ratio in the postwar period
was never allowed to fall below 2.7 percent, which justifies the
conclusion that this group of corporations also emerged from
World War I without any excess liquidity.100 CorporateCash 1914.43
WORLD WAR II
The liquidity position of large trade companies in World War II
is different from that of large manufacturing corporations. Cash
balances rose by 76 percent from 1939 to 1943, compared with
an increase of 78 percent for total means of payment and a rise
of 47 percent for the cash of large manufacturing corporations.
Marketable securities show a much steeper increase, multiplying
almost 19 times in the same period; the marketable securities of
large manufacturing corporations multiplied only four and a half
times. The result is that the ratio of liquid funds to payments
for large trade companies reached 14.1 percent in 1943, com-
pared with only 5.6 percent in 1937 (Table 7). Even if allowance
is made for the fact that increased tax liabilities require increased
liquidity, large trade companies in 1943 were much more liquid
than in 1937.(The ratio of cash plus marketable securities to
payments after deducting tax liabilities from both the numerator
and denominator for 1943 is 8 percent.) A sources and uses of
funds analysis of the sample of large trade corporations reveals
that the main reason for the difference in the liquidity of large
Table 7—LIQUIDITY POSITION OF SAMPLE A




















1937 $ 98.7 $ 15.2 $2,045.7 . 4.8% 5.6%
1938 119.7 11.8 1,921.0 6.2 6.8
1939 127.4 12.1 2,191.1 5.8 6.4
1940 126.1 10.6 2,376.3 5.3 5.8
1941 148.9 40.2 2,996.3 5.0 6.3
1942 197.9 145.1 3,166.9 6.2 10.8
1943 217.9 239.8 3,251.4 6.7 14.1
a Fora description of the sample see Appendix A.
b Average of two successive year-end figures.
CRatioof average cash of two successive year ends to total payments in the year
between the two dates.
dRatio of average cash plus average marketable securities of two successive year
ends to total payments in the year between the two dates.Trade Corporations lOt
trade and large manufacturing corporations is that the trade
companies, which are engaged in the distribution of consumer
goods, have liquidated their receivables since 1941; in addition
their equipment(including land, building, and merchandising
equipment) in the years 1942 and 1943 declined, which also
resulted in an inflow of cash. These factors together with others
that are quantitatively less important increased the liquid funds
which had to be held either as cash or in the form of marketable
securities.
Although trade companies are not faced with a reconversion
problem in the sense of shifting to fundamentally different activi-
ties, they will find themselves at the end of the war with inferior
goods which will be difficult to sell. They will have to stock up
again with "peacetime" commodities, using their excess liquid
funds to finance the building up of these new inventories. In addi-
tion, equipment which was run-down during the war will have to
be replaced and receivables will be built up again. No general
statement can be ventured as to whether their excess funds are
sufficient for these purposes or whether outside financing will
be required.
Our sample of medium-sized and small trade corporations has
the same defects for an analysis of the present war period as the
sample for the corresponding size group of manufacturing cor-
porations; that is, the latest figures are those for 1942, and market-
able securities are not available separately but are included in the
item "investments," which comprises both permanent investments
and marketable securities. For this size group, however, a sample
of 634 corporations is available for the period This
sample shows an increase of 171 percent in cash between the end
of 1940 and the close of 1943; marketable securities in the same
period multiplied 20 times. The ratio of average cash plus market-
able securities to sales (which have to be taken as a substitute for
payments) rose from 2.4 percent in 1941 to 5.9 percent in 1943.
Even if tax liabilities are deducted from the numerator and the
denominator, the ratio still shows a substantial increase. This size
group, like the large trade corporations, has improved its liquidity
position.The difference observed in the development of the
9Datacompiled by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, who
have courteously allowed their use in this study.102 CorporateCash Balances, 1914-43
liquidity position of medium-sized and small and of large manu-
facturing corporations does not exist between the corresponding
size groups of trade corporations.
SUMMARY
(1) In the interwar period the trend of cash balances of large trade cor-
porations is steeper than the trend of their payments. This results in
a rising trend of the ratio of cash to payments. The ratio of cash plus
marketable securities to payments does not show a corresponding upward
trend in this period.
(2) "Free" cash of large trade companies does not display the same move-
ment as "free" cash of large manufacturing corporations. But in the
thirties "free" liquid funds (cash pius marketable securities) show on
the whole the same movement as "free" liquid funds for large manu-
facturing corporations, and for substantially the same reasons.
(3) At the close of W'orld I the large trade corporations, in contrast
to manufacturing corporations, were less liquid than at the beginning
of the war. Medium-sized and small corporations also emerged from
World War I without any excess liquidity.
(4) In World War lithe large trade companies, unlike large manufactur-
ing companies, have built up an "excess" liquidity, mainly in the form
of marketable securities.This is due primarily to the fact that they
liquidated their receivables on a large scale.Medium-sized and small
companies also have improved their liquidity position.